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Abstract
Market confidence is essential for successful investing. By incorporating
multi-market into the evolutionary minority game, we investigate the effects
of investor beliefs on the evolution of collective behaviors and asset prices.
It is found that the roles of market confidence are closely related to whether
or not there exists another market. When there exists another investment
opportunity, different market confidence may lead to the same price fluctu-
ations and the same investment attainment. There are two feedback effects.
Being overly optimistic about a particular asset makes an investor become
insensitive to losses. A delayed strategy adjustment leads to a decline in
wealth and one’s runaway from the market. The withdrawal of the agents
results in the optimization of the strategy distributions and an increase in
wealth. Being overly pessimistic about a particular asset makes an investor
over-sensitive to losses. One’s too frequent strategy adjustment leads to a
decline in wealth. The withdrawal of the agents results in the improvement
of the market environment and an increase in wealth.
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1. Introduction
Complex phenomena are ubiquitous in the natural world and human
society[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Different from microscopic and macroscopic mo-
tions in the physical world, the price movement in financial markets is not
only affected by physical factors but also psychological factors[8, 9, 10]. In
the face of a wide range of investment options, people often exhibit a strong
preference for a specific investment product, which is often affected by differ-
ent levels of market confidence, being optimistic, neutral or pessimistic about
the market. For example, some people have a strong preference for real estate
owing to collective overconfidence but not a rational analysis. Psychologi-
cal studies have shown that overconfidence (underconfidence) can cause in-
vestors to underreact (overreact) to new information, especially to investment
losses[11, 12, 13, 14]. Therefore, overconfidence (underconfidence) can be de-
fined as collective willful (denial) blindness. When people are overconfident
(underconfident) in a market, they exhibit overoptimism (overpessimism) to
the market and are insensitive (oversensitive) to the losses.[15, 16, 17].
In exploring the evolutionary dynamics of complex systems, a variety
of game models have been introduced[18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. In modeling
the evolutionary mechanism in financial systems, the minority game (MG)
and its variant, the evolutionary minority game (EMG)[24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29],
have become promising tools. In the financial markets, market impact, which
measures an upward or a downward tendency of the prices subsequent to a
trade buying or selling a given size, is a key factor for an agent to consider
before he is ready for a shift in investment[30, 31]. Because of the sequential
process of making deals, market impact may not be fully reflected in the
transaction price. If one can make a trade with an immediate price, the
transaction price includes no market impact. If one makes a trade with a
next price, the transaction price includes full market impact.
By incorporating market impact into the MG[32, 33], Yeung et al. have
investigated the effects of market impact on the evolution of stock prices. By
incorporating behavioral patterns into the EMG, Zhong et al. have exam-
ined the roles of behavioral biases in the movement of stock prices[34, 35].
The above studies have only told us what are the main factors affecting
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the stock prices in a single market, but not what roles these factors may
play in multiple markets. In real financial systems, there are so many assets
that an individual can invest in and how the equilibrium can be reached be-
tween different markets is a central problem. Although the multi-resource (or
multi-market) problems have been studied recently [36, 37, 38, 39], the roles
of behavioral biases in the evolution of stock prices in multiple markets is still
an open question. To reproduce the dynamical processes in multiple markets,
in the present work, we incorporate market confidence and differently ranked
markets ( assets) into the EMG. The following is our main findings.
(1) Different market confidence does not always lead to different market
movement. If there are free choices for the agents to enter or withdraw from
the markets, the same price fluctuations and investment attainments may
occur between the markets with different levels of collective confidence.
(2) The fluctuation in asset prices is determined by the strategy distri-
bution and the number of agents trading the asset. The clustering of the
strategies leads to a large fluctuation in asset prices and the decrease in the
number of agents suppresses the price fluctuation.
(3) The strategy distribution is determined by the coupled effects of strat-
egy updating and shift in markets. For the market with collective overcon-
fidence, the strategy distribution is mainly determined by the withdrawal
of investors. For the market with collective underconfidence, the strategy
distribution is mainly determined by strategy updating.
The whole paper is organized as follows. The EMG with multiple choices
is introduced in section 2. In Section 3, we give simulation results and discus-
sions about the evolution of the strategies and the asset prices. The coupled
dynamics of strategy updating and shift in investment is analyzed depending
upon the mean field theory in Section 4. Conclusions are summarized in
Section 5.
2. The model
There are total N agents who repeatedly make investment in one of the
two markets, market A (asset A) and market B (asset B). Originally, each
agent chooses his investment asset randomly. At each time step, an agent
makes his decision on buying (a=+1), selling (a=-1) or taking a holding
position (a=0) according to the latest asset price information available to
everyone and his investment strategy, which is denoted by a probability,
called gene value, 0 ≤ g ≤ 1. Faced with the m-bit long price information,
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agent i will take actions according to the prediction with probability g and
contrary to the prediction with probability 1− g[24, 25].
After all the agents have made their decisions, the stock price is deter-
mined by the following equation[33]
P (t+ 1) = P (t) + sgn[A(t)]
√
| A(t) |, (1)
in which A(t) =
∑NAorNB
i=1 ai(t), N = NA +NB and ai(t)=+1, -1, or 0.
The market impact, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, is incorporated into the present model in
the transaction price,
Ptr(t) = (1− β)P (t) + βP (t+ 1). (2)
For full market impact, β = 1, which means that the queue is so long that
the agent can only make a trade with the next price, not the immediate price
he mostly appreciates, Ptr(t) = P (t+1). For no market impact, β = 0, which
means that there is no other agent before the agent and he can trade with
the immediate price, Ptr(t) = P (t).
The attainment of agent i at a buy-sell asset transaction is determined
by
Bi = P
sell
i − P buyi , (3)
in which P buyi is the transaction price he buys the asset and P
sell
i is the
transaction price he sells the asset. The accumulated attainment is defined
as the wealth,
Wi =
tmax∑
t=1
Bi. (4)
The investment strategy evolves according to the strategy score
S = S+ + γS−, (5)
in which S+ =
∑
B+ is the accumulated gain and S− =
∑
B− is the accu-
mulated loss after the strategy has been adopted. There exists a threshold
Sth, for S ≥ Sth, one does not update his strategy. For S < Sth, one randomly
chooses a new strategy from [g-R
2
,g+R
2
] with a reflecting boundary condition
and the strategy score is reset to 0.
The parameter γ of market confidence is incorporated into the model in
the strategy score. For a highly-ranked asset, which may be the stock of a
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company with outstanding achievements, people exhibit collective overcon-
fidence in the market and 0 < γ < 1, which implies that the agents are
overoptimistic about the market, therefore, they are insensitive to the losses
and underreact to new information. For an extreme case γ = 0, from equa-
tion (5) we find that no matter what the losses are, S is always larger than 0
and the agent will never change his strategy for Sth < 0. For a lowly-ranked
asset, which may be the stock of a newly listed company, people exhibit
collective underconfidence in the market and γ > 1, which implies that the
agents are overpessimistic about the market, therefore, they are oversensitive
to the losses and overreact to new information. From equation (5) we find
that S is more possible to be less than 0 for a large γ > 1. To understand
how the market confidence affects the population behavior in the system with
differently ranked markets, throughout the paper, for the agents investing in
market A, the value of market confidence is γ = 1, which means, people have
rational market confidence in market A. By changing market confidence in
market B from a small value to a large value, the evolutionary behavior in
multi-market will be observed.
A shift in investment only occurs when the accumulated attainment ω is
less than the threshold ωth.
ω =
tout∑
t=tin
B, (6)
in which tin is the time one enters the market and tout is the time one with-
draws from the market. For ω ≥ ωth, one is possible to update his strategy
but not his investment asset.
3. Results and discussions
Figure 1 (a) and (b) depict the mean population NB investing in asset
B versus market impact β for market confidence γA=1 and different γB.
For a small γB=0.1, which corresponds to the situation where people are
overconfident in asset B, as β increases from 0 to 0.5, NB decreases with the
rise of β. As β increases from 0.5 to 1.0, NB changes little with the rise
of β. Increasing γB leads to an overall increase in NB within the range of
0 ≤ β < 0.5. For γB > 1, i.e. γB=1.02, which corresponds to the situation
where people are underconfident in asset B, as β increases from 0 to 0.5, NB
changes little with the rise of β. As β increases from 0.5 to 1.0, NB decreases
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Figure 1: The averaged number of agents NB investing in asset B in the final steady
state as functions of β and γB respectively for N = 10
3, Sth = −4, ωth= -200, γA=1.
(a)γB=0.1 (circles), 0.8 (squares), 0.9 (diamonds), 1.0 (triangles); (b)γB=1.0 (triangles),
1.05 (pluses), 2.0 (chars);(c)β=0.2; (d) β=0.8. Final results are averaged over 100 runs
and 103 time steps with 105 relaxation time in each run.
with the rise of β. Increasing γB leads to an overall decrease in NB within
the range of 0.5 < β ≤ 1.0. The transition point βtr ∼ 0.5 is observed.
The dependence of NB on γB for β=0.2 and 0.8 can also be observed in
fig.1 (c) and (d). For β=0.2, as γB ranges from 0.01 to 1, NB increases with
the rise of γB. A further increase in γB leads to a slow decrease in NB. For
β=0.8, as γB increases from 0.1 to 1.0, NB changes little with the rise of γB.
As γB increases from 1 to 8.0, NB firstly decreases quickly and then retains a
fixed value of NB ∼ 375 with the rise of γB. The transition point γBtr ∼ 1.0
is observed.
In fig. 2, the strategy distributions of the agents investing in asset A
and asset B are plotted for γB=0.1, 2, β=0.2, 0.8 and ωth=-200, −2 × 107
respectively. For a small γB=0.1. When the agents can not withdraw from
the markets freely, i.e. ωth=−2 × 107, the strategy distribution is only de-
termined by γB. In market A, most of the strategies cluster at g ∼ 0.49 for
β=0.2 and the strategy distribution is like a U−shape for β=0.8. In market
B, the strategy distribution is like a uniform strategy distribution for both
β=0.2 and β=0.8. When the agents can withdraw from the markets freely,
i.e. ωth = −200, it is observed that the strategy distributions in market A
6
00.02
0.04
0.06
   =-2
   =-2
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.03
0.06
0.09
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
ω
th
ω th
g
P(
g ) A
P(
g ) B
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
β=0.2
γ =0.1B
β=0.2
Bγ =0.1
β=0.2
B
γ =2.0
β=0.2
=2.0γ 
B
β=0.8 β=0.8
β=0.8 β=0.8
B
γ 
γ γ 
B
B B
γ =0.1
=2.0
=0.1 =2.0
2
10
107
Figure 2: The strategy distribution of the agents investing in asset A and asset B in the
final steady state for N = 103, Sth = −4, γA=1, ωth = −200 (circles), −2× 107 (squares).
(a)P (gA) for β=0.2, γB=0.1; (b) P (gA) for β=0.2, γB=2.0; (c)P (gA) for β=0.8, γB=0.1;
(d) P (gA) for β=0.8, γB=2.0; (e)P (gB) for β=0.2, γB=0.1; (f) P (gB) for β=0.2, γB=2.0;
(g)P (gB) for β=0.8, γB=0.1; (h) P (gB) for β=0.8, γB=2.0. Final results are averaged
over 103 time steps after 105 relaxation time in a run.
and market B are nearly the same. For β=0.2, the strategies in market A
(market B) are evenly distributed within the range of g < 0.5 (g > 0.5). For
β=0.8, the strategy distributions in market A and market B are both like a
U−shape. For a large γB=2. It is observed that the strategy distributions
are nearly the same for ωth = −200 and ωth = −2 × 107, which implies that
the strategy distributions are not affected by shift in markets.
Figure 3 shows the standard deviation of stock prices as a function of γB
for β=0.2, 0.8 and ωth = −200, −2×107 respectively. From fig. 3 (a) and (c)
we observe that, for ωth = −200, the change of σPA is similar to the change
of σPB . As γB increases from 0.01 to 1.0, σPA and σPB decrease with the rise
of γB. As γB increases from 1.0 to 8, σPA and σPB increase with the rise of
γB. Comparing the results for ωth = −200 with the results for ωth=−2×107,
we find that σPA (σPB) for ωth = −200 is larger than that for ωth=−2× 107,
which implies that it should be the shift in investment that leads to the rise
of σPA and σPB . From fig. 3 (b) and (d) we observe that, for ωth = −200, the
change of σPA is also similar to the change of σPB . As γB increases from 0.01
to 1.0, σPA and σPB change little with the rise of γB. As γB increases from
1.0 to 8, σPA and σPB firstly have a sharp increase and then change little
with the rise of γB. Comparing the results for ωth = −200 with the results
for ωth=−2× 107, we also find that it should be the shift in investment that
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Figure 3: The standard deviation of the prices of asset A and asset B as a function of
γB for N = 10
3, Sth = −4, γA=1, ωth = −200 (circles), −2 × 107 (squares). (a) σPA for
β = 0.2; (b)σPA for β = 0.8; (c) σPB for β = 0.2; (d)σPB for β = 0.8. Final results are
averaged over 100 runs and 103 time steps with 105 relaxation time in each run.
leads to the similar price fluctuations in market A and market B.
To understand the relationship between the attainment of the agents and
the price fluctuations in market A and market B, in fig. 4 we plot the average
wealth of the population investing in asset A and asset B as a function of γB.
Comparing the results in fig. 4 with those in fig.3, we find that the average
wealth is closely related to the fluctuations in asset prices. For β < 0.5, a
large σP corresponds to a large W . For β > 0.5, a large σP corresponds to a
small W .
4. Theoretical analysis
4.1. Reasons for the existence of an equilibrium between different markets
Consider the existence of two markets. When there is no relationship
between different markets, the evolution of strategies is determined by the
market confidence γ and the market impact β. For a quite small γ, the
strategy score, which satisfies S = S+ + γS−, will be greater than 0. There-
fore, for a threshold Sth < 0, the strategies will not evolve with time. A
uniform strategy distribution, which is the same as the initial one, will be
found within the whole range of 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. For an intermediate or a large
γ, the strategy distribution should be determined by β. For β < 0.5, the
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Figure 4: The average wealth of the population investing in asset A and asset B in the
final steady state as a function of γB for N = 10
3, Sth = −4, γA=1 and ωth = −200
(circles), −2 × 107 (squares). (a)WA for β=0.2; (b) WA for β=0.8; (c)WB for β = 0.2;
(d) WB for β = 0.8. Final results are averaged over 100 runs and 10
3 time steps with 105
relaxation time in each run.
strategies cluster at a particular strategy g0, which increases (or decreases)
with the rise of γ. For β > 0.5, the strategy distribution exhibits a U−shape
for an intermediate γ and a uniform distribution for a large γ.
If the agents have the right to choose between different markets, the
evolution of strategies will be determined by the timescale between strategy
updating and shift in markets. On condition that there exists an ordinary
market, market A, in which γA = 1, and a specific market, market B, in
which γB ranges from 0 to infinity. In market A, the agents using the bad
strategies will update their strategies with probability ρA and withdraw from
the market with probability ρ′A. In market B, the agents using the bad
strategies will update their strategies with probability ρB and withdraw from
the market with probability ρ′B.
Only consider a quite small γB < 1. For β < 0.5, the majority effect leads
to half of the strategies are good strategies and half of the strategies are bad
strategies. Suppose ρA=ρ
′
A=0.5, ρB=0, ρ
′
B=1. In the final steady state, NA
and NB satisfy the equation
NA −NB = N0(1− q
n)
1− q , (7)
9
in which N0 =
N
4
, q = 1
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and n→∞. Therefore, for β < 0.5, the strategies in
the two markets are both evenly distributed within the range of g > 0.5 (or
g < 0.5) and NA is larger than NB. For β > 0.5, the minority effect leads to
two thirds of the strategies are good strategies and one third of the strategies
are bad strategies. Suppose ρA=
2
3
, ρ′A=
1
3
, ρB=0, ρ
′
B=1. In the final steady
state, NA and NB also satisfy the equation NA − NB = N0(1−qn)1−q , in which
N0 =
N
6
, q = 1
27
and n → ∞. Therefore, within the range of β > 0.5, the
strategies of the agents in the two markets will both self-segregate into g ∼ 0
and g ∼ 1. The difference between NA and NB for β > 0.5 is less than the
difference between NA and NB for β < 0.5.
4.2. Coupled effects of strategy distribution and number of agents on price
fluctuations
The price return of an asset is determined by the difference between the
numbers of agents buying and selling the asset,
P (t+ 1)− P (t) =
√
∆N, (∆N ≥ 0) (8)
P (t+ 1)− P (t) = −√−∆N, (∆N < 0). (9)
The variance of the price becomes
σ2 =
∑t+∆t
i=t | ∆Ni |
∆t
. (10)
As discussed in ref.[34], | ∆Ni | is closely related to the strategy distri-
bution. Only consider β > 0.5. As the strategy distribution changes from a
uniform distribution to a U−shape distribution, | ∆Ni | changes from
√
N
to a smaller value. Therefore, when there is no relationship between differ-
ent markets, the price fluctuation in market A should be lower than that in
market B.
In the present model, the shift in markets is determined by the attainment
in the market. After one has finished a sale, his attainment is[34]
Pi(tsell)− Pi(tbuy) ∼ f(N)(1− 2β), (11)
in which f(N) > 0. For β > 0.5, Pi(tsell) − Pi(tbuy) < 0. A larger price
fluctuation will lead to more losses. Therefore, the agents in market B are
more possible to withdraw than the agents in market A. With the increase in
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NA and the decrease in NB, the price fluctuation in market A increases and
the price fluctuation in market B decreases. Finally, the price fluctuations
in the two markets become the same and an equilibrium between different
market is reached.
5. Summary
By incorporating market confidence into the evolutionary minority game,
we have investigated the effects of overconfidence and under-confidence on
the evolution of collective behaviors and asset prices. The evolution of as-
set prices is closely related to the strategy distribution and the number of
agents in the market. The clustering of the strategies leads to a large price
fluctuation and the decrease of the number of agents leads to a decline in
price fluctuations. Depending upon the coupling of the changes in the strat-
egy distribution and the number of agents, an equilibrium between different
markets is reached.
In the future, the heterogeneous market confidence should be considered
in the evolution of asset prices. The coupled effects of market confidence and
spatial structures on the evolution of collective behaviors should be a favorite
of ours.
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